An exploration of the evolution of US intelligence
concerning the combat capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its air arm
during the interwar period and the Pacific War
Ford contends that the US Navy could not accurately determine the
fighting efficiency of Japan’s forces until it engaged them
in actual battle conditions over an extended period. As the conflict progressed,
the Americans were able to rely on a growing array of intelligence material,
including prisoners-of-war, captured documents and specimens of captured enemy
weapons. These sources often revealed valuable information on the
characteristics of Japanese equipment, as well as some of the ideas and
doctrines which governed how they carried out their operations. Firsthand
observations of the Japanese navy’s performance in battle were the most
frequently used source of intelligence which enabled the US Navy to develop a
more informed assessment of its opponent.
The Elusive Enemy aims to explain how American perceptions concerning
the Japanese navy evolved during the conflict, with a particular focus on the
role of intelligence. It also seeks to introduce a new perspective on the
question as to why the US Navy carried out its campaigns during the Pacific War
in the manner that it did.
